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Abstract
Residual income as commonly described in academic papers and in real-life applications may be
formally described as a function of three variables: (i) the capital invested, (ii) the rate of return,
(iii) the opportunity cost of capital. This paper shows that a different paradigm of residual income is
generated if a fourth element is added: (iv) the capital that investors lose if they infuse their funds in
the firm (or project). The lost-capital paradigm has various interesting economic, financial, accounting
interpretations and bears intriguing formal and conceptual relations to the standard paradigm. It may
be soundly employed in real-life applications as a tool for rewarding managers as well as for appraising
firms. Firm value is shown to be independent not only of dividends, but also of time, if the new paradigm
is used: what matters is only the book value and the sum of total expected residual incomes, not the
periods in which they are generated. This aggregation property is particular important for highlighting
the link between accounting values and market values. A numerical example illustrates the practical
implementation of the new paradigm to the Economic Value Added and the Edwards-Bell-Ohlson model;
also, a model is presented which has the nice property of being aligned in sign with the Net Present Value:
this makes it a good candidate for use in value-based management.
Keywords. Corporate finance, management accounting, residual income, performance measurement,
lost capital, value-based management, firm valuation, abnormal earnings aggregation.
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1 Introduction
Management accounting and corporate finance find a common terrain in the study of the notion of residual
income, also called abnormal earning, which is formally computed as the difference between the actual income
and the counterfactual income investors would receive if they invested their funds at the opportunity cost
of capital. Coined by the General Electric Company, the term first appears in the literature in Solomons
(1965, p. 63), although the same concept, differently labeled, was studied even earlier (e.g. Preinreich, 1936,
1938). The important contributions of Peasnell (1981, 1982) and Ohlson (1989, 1995) have caused a renewed
interest in this notion in both management accounting and corporate finance, with particular regard to firm
valuation, performance measurement, value-based management. A large number of theoretical and applied
studies have appeared dealing with the subject (e.g. Stewart, 1991; Ohlson, 1995; Feltham and Ohlson, 1995;
Rappaport, 1998; Lundholm and O’Keefe, 2001; Young and O’Byrne, 2001; Martin et al. 2003; Weaver and
Weston, 2003; O’Byrne and Young, 2006) and a large number of textbooks and professional publications in
corporate finance, managerial finance, management accounting directly deal with the topic (e.g. Brealey and
Myers, 2000; Copeland et al., 2000; Palepu et al., 2000; Grinblatt and Titman, 2002; Revsine et al., 2005;
Arnold, 2005).
An alternative paradigm of residual income has been recently introduced by Magni (2000, 2003, 2005)
which differs, conceptually and formally, from the standard paradigm used by academics, analysts and prac-
titioners. This paper aims at shedding light on this paradigm by focussing on its relevance for management
accounting and provides some theoretical and practical results relevant for both valuation and incentive
compensation. In particular, the standard paradigm may be seen as grounded on three elements: (i) the
actual capital invested, (ii) the actual rate of return, (iii) the opportunity cost of capital (the foregone rate
of return). The alternative paradigm takes into consideration an additional element: the lost capital, and is
therefore here named lost-capital paradigm. As a paradigm, it generates several new metrics, in particular
one for any existing metric in the standard paradigm. The new paradigm is presented in four autonomous
though equivalent ways, in order to show its multifaceted significance and its sound economic meaning, and
some differences and relations between the two paradigms are investigated. In particular, the new paradigm
enables one to compute the project’s (firm’s) market value leaving out any consideration about timing: value
is a function of book value and the sum of residual incomes: earnings aggregation, as opposed to discounting,
applies.
A numerical example is also illustrated, where the paradigm is applied to the well-known Economic
Value Added (Stewart, 1991) and to the so-called Edwards-Bell-Ohlson model (Ohlson, 1995). Furthermore,
a third metric, namely Ferna´ndez’s (2002) Created Shareholder Value, is transformed into the corresponding
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lost-capital metric. The conversion originates a metric that is consistent in sign with the Net Present
Value. Therefore, this metric is particularly suited for managerial compensation, given that it directly ties
performance to value creation.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the standard paradigm of residual income.1
Section 3 presents the new paradigm from four different points of view: (i) a replicating cash-flow and
its outstanding capital, (ii) the investor’s wealth and its evolution through time, (iii) the construction of
alternative depreciation plans and the keynesian notion of user cost, (iv) the lost-capital as an accumulation
of past standard residual incomes. Section 4 investigates some relations between the two paradigms. Section
5 shows that the lost-capital paradigm is compatible with the Net Present Value (and the Market Value
Added) and that value may be derived from lost-capital residual incomes by neglecting timing: only the sum
of residual incomes is of concern for computing market value. Section 6 focuses on Economic Value Added
and the Edwards-Bell-Ohlson model: first, they are derived as particular cases of the standard paradigm;
then, the companion metrics are introduced in the lost-capital paradigm. Section 7 illustrates an example
aiming at shedding light on the behavior of the two pairs of metrics and suggesting some possible implications
for executive compensation, under the assumption that expectations are met. Section 8 shows that the lost-
capital companion of Ferna´ndez’s (2002) Created Shareholder Value is aligned in sign with the Net Present
Value. Some concluding remarks end the paper.
For all notational conventions the reader should refer to Table 12 at the end of the paper.
2 The standard paradigm
Let ~a=(−a0, a1, . . . , an) be an expected cash-flow stream released by project (firm) a in the span of n periods.
Let x1, . . . xn be periodic rates of return such that
a0 =
n∑
t=1
at∏t
k=1(1 + xk)
.
For notational convenience we will often omit time subscripts, as long as ambiguity does not arise. Therefore,
the above equation may be rewritten as
a0 =
n∑
t=1
at
(1 + x)t
where (1 + x)t should be read as
∏t
k=1(1 + xk). Thus, the symbol x represents either an internal rate of
return or, rather, an internal discount function for project a that generalizes the notion of internal rate of
1The nouns ‘profit’, ‘income’, ‘return’, ‘earning’ will be used as synonyms, as well as the adjectives ‘excess’, ‘residual’,
‘abnormal’.
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return (Peasnell, 1982, p. 367. See also Franks and Hodges, 1984; Brief and Lawson, 1992).
Let wt(x), t = 1, 2, . . . , n be arbitrary numbers such that
wt(x) = wt−1(x)(1 + x)− at t = 1, . . . , n (1)
with w0(x):=a0. The above equation may conveniently be interpreted as the recursion formula for the
project’s outstanding capital. The undertaking of the project implies that, at the outset of each period,
the capital wt−1(x) is invested at the internal rate x, thus producing the interest xwt−1(x), which one may
interpret as the profit of that period. Excess profit is profit above the profit that could be earned if the
capital were invested in an alternative course of action (i.e. at an alternative rate of return). Letting i be
the foregone rate of return (assumed constant for mere convenience), i 6= x, the foregone return in case of
project rejection amounts to iwt−1(x). The latter is also known as opportunity cost.2 The excess profit, or
residual income, in the t-th period is therefore
RISt = xwt−1(x)− iwt−1(x) = wt−1(x)(x− i) (2)
where xwt−1(x) is the actual income. The formalization in eq. (2) is the classical one employed in the relevant
literature (e.g. Edwards and Bell, 1961; Peasnell, 1981, 1982; Peccati, 1992; Ohlson, 1995; Lundholm and
O’Keefe, 2001). This approach evidently rests on three basic elements: outstanding capital, internal rate of
return, opportunity cost of capital. Different metrics are generated by this scheme, grounded on different
notions of capital employed (asset side, equity side, economic, accounting, etc.), of cash flows employed (Free
Cash Flow, Equity Cash Flow, Capital Cash Flow3), of internal discount function employed (ROA, RONA,
ROE, etc.).
Remark 1. It is worth noting that eq. (1) is consistent with the clean surplus concept (Brief and Peasnell,
1996). In business economics, it lies at the core of the notion of income (Lee, 1985); in financial and
actuarial mathematics, it represents the recursion formula for computing the balance (residual debt) in a
loan contract (Kellison, 1991; Promislow, 2006). The similarities between accounting and finance are here
profound. Rewriting the equation as at=xwt−1(x) − (wt−1(x) − wt(x)) one may interpret the right-hand
side either as the difference between income and change in book value or as the difference between interest
and principal repayments: the former takes a management accounting perspective, the latter a financial one.
However, to maintain consistency with Net Present Value, wt(x) may be any number as long as x satisfies
the equation: book value is therefore only one among many infinite possible choices.4
2Opportunity cost=foregone return, opportunity cost of capital=foregone rate of return.
3For the notion of Capital Cash Flow, see Ruback (2002) and Ferna´ndez (2002).
4Admittedly, wt itself may be labelled book value, given that book value is, in principle, arbitrary. In this view, for example,
market value is only a particular choice of book value.
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3 The lost-capital paradigm
The opportunity cost of investing in project a is that of renouncing to investing funds at the opportunity cost
of capital i. This section presents a different way of interpreting the notion of foregone return, and therefore
a different way of interpreting the notion of residual income. Originally introduced and investigated in Magni
(2000, 2003, 2005), this section shows that it may derived from four different (but logically equivalent) sound
economic arguments.
3.1 The replicating cash-flow argument
As seen in the previous section, if the investor invests a0 in the project, his cash-flow is ~a and the residual
capital invested is wt−1(x), which is a dynamic system represented by
wt(x) = wt−1(x)(1 + x)− at. (3)
Accepting the project the investor foregoes the opportunity of investing a0 in an alternative asset from
which he could as well periodically withdraw the amounts at, t = 1, . . . , n, so realizing the same pattern
of cash flows as project a. Let wt(i) be the outstanding balance at time t if the investor invests a0 in the
alternative asset. In this case, the capital employed increases at the rate i, but falls by the amount at, which
is withdrawn from the balance at the end of the period. This is described by the recurrence equation
wt(i) = wt−1(i)(1 + i)− at (4)
where, obviously, w0(i):=a0. Thus, if project is accepted, the outstanding balance in the t-th period is
wt−1(x); if, instead, the alternative asset is accepted, the outstanding balance is wt−1(i), which is here
named the lost capital. The rate of return in the former case is x; the rate of return in the latter case is i.
Hence, the income in the former case is xwt−1(x), the income in the latter case is iwt−1(i). The residual
income is therefore:
RILt = xwt−1(x)− iwt−1(i). (5)
The second addend is a lost return, obtained by multiplying the foregone return rate i by the lost capital
wt−1(i).
This argument is evidently arbitrage-based: if a0 is invested in the project (firm), the payoff vector is
(a1, a2, . . . , an); if instead a0 is invested at the cost of capital, the payoff stream is (a1, a2, . . . , an + wn(i)).
The terminal lost capital wn(i) is the resulting arbitrage payoff generated by the replicating portfolio. If
it is negative, project a is worth undertaking: a long position on the project and a short position on the
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alternative asset yield the arbitrage payoff vector (0, 0, 0, . . . ,−wn(i)); if it is positive, the replicating cash-
flow stream should be selected: a long position on the latter and a short position on a yield the arbitrage
payoff vector (0, 0, 0, . . . , wn(i)).
3.2 The wealth increase argument
Let us assume that an investor currently invests funds in a financial asset yielding a periodic return rate
equal to i and let W0 be his net worth at time 0. If project a is not undertaken, the investor’s wealth evolves
according to the recursive equation
Wt(i) = Wt−1(i)(1 + i) (6)
so that Wt(i) = W0(1 + i)t. If, instead, project a is undertaken, the investor, while renouncing to investing
a0 at the rate i, receives the periodic sums at, which may be reinvested at the rate i in the financial asset.5
In this case, the investor’s wealth is a portfolio of two assets evolving at the rates x and i respectively. At
time t, the investor’s wealth amounts to
Wt(x, i) = wt(x) + (Wt−1(x, i)− wt−1(x)) (1 + i) + at (7)
where wt(x) is determined by eq. (3). Solving eq. (7) we find
Wt(x, i) = wt(x) + (W0 − a0) (1 + i)t +
t∑
k=1
ak(1 + i)t−k.
This implies that wealth increase in case of project acceptance is
Wt(x, i)−Wt−1(x, i) = xwt−1(x) + i
(
(W0 − a0) (1 + i)t−1 +
t−1∑
k=1
ak(1 + i)t−1−k
)
,
whereas wealth increase in case of project rejection is
Wt(i)−Wt−1(i) = iW0(1 + i)t−1.
Therefore, the excess increase in wealth is given by the difference of the alternative wealth increases:
excess increase =
(
Wt(x, i)−Wt−1(x, i)
)− (Wt(i)−Wt−1(i))
= xwt−1(x)− ia0(1 + i)t−1 + i
t−1∑
k=1
ak(1 + i)t−1−k.
(8)
5Note that this is just the standard assumption of the NPV rule.
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From eq. (4), we have wt−1(i) = a0(1 + i)t−1 −
∑t−1
k=1 ak(1 + i)
t−1−k, so that eq. (8) becomes
excess return = xwt−1(x)− iwt−1(i) = RILt (9)
It is worth noting that we have found RILt by making use of two alternative hypotheses about the evolution
of the investor’s wealth, namely the two dynamic systems in eq. (6) and eq. (7).
Note also that we may ideally part the investor’s wealth into two assets in both cases:
Wt−1(x, i) =
asset invested at rate x︷ ︸︸ ︷
wt−1(x) +
asset invested at rate i︷ ︸︸ ︷(
Wt−1(x, i)− wt−1(x)
)
(10)
Wt−1(i) =
asset invested at rate i︷ ︸︸ ︷
(Wt−1(i)−Wt−1(x, i) + wt−1(x)) +
asset invested at rate i︷ ︸︸ ︷(
Wt−1(x, i)− wt−1(x)
)
. (11)
The differential return between the two alternatives is not dependent on the second addends, which are shared
by both alternatives; they may therefore be dismissed and, applying the corresponding rates of return, we
find
excess return = xwt−1(x)− i(Wt−1(i)−Wt−1(x, i) + wt−1(x)).
Using the fact that Wt−1(i)−Wt−1(x, i) + wt−1(x) = wt−1(i) one finds back RILt .
3.3 The depreciation argument (a)
The lost-capital residual income may be ideally obtained by transforming the two alternative courses of
action into two alternative depreciation schedules.
Consider asset A, producing the cash-flow ~A=(−a0, a1, a2, . . . , an + sn), where sn is the asset’s scrap
value, received at the end of its service life. Let vt be the accounting value of this asset at time t (with
v0:=a0) and let Dept:=vt−1 − vt be the depreciation charge in the t-th period. While any depreciation such
that
∑n
t=1 Dept = a0 is acceptable for accounting purposes (see Peasnell, 1982), there is one significant from
an economic point of view: the decline in the present value of asset A’s future cash flows; letting r be the
discount rate, this asset’s accounting value is
vt =
n∑
k=t+1
ak
(1 + r)k−t
+
sn
(1 + r)n−t
(12)
and the accounting profit is therefore rvt−1. From the usual accounting identity (clean surplus relation)
cash flows = income + depreciation
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we find Dept(r)=at − rvt−1, and, using eq. (12), we get to
Dept(r) = at − r
( n∑
k=t
ak
(1 + r)k−(t−1)
+
sn
(1 + r)n−(t−1)
)
,
where sn = sn(r)=a0(1 + r)n −
∑n
t=1 at(1 + r)
n−t.
The decision of accepting or rejecting project a boils down, in this view, to a choice between different de-
preciation plans for asset A: the accountant may ideally select the depreciation schedule such that r=x or, al-
ternatively, the one where r=i.6 In the former case, the scrap value becomes sn(x)=a0(1 + x)n −
∑n
t=1 at(1 + x)
n−t,
which equals zero, given that x is the internal rate of return (discount function) of project a. In the latter
case, the scrap value is sn(i)=a0(1 + i)n −
∑n
t=1 at(1 + i)
n−t.7
From the point of view of periodic performance, we may say that if the depreciation charge is smaller
with r=x than with r=i (i.e. if the value of asset A decreases less rapidly with acceptance of project a),
then performance is positive. In other words, the difference
Dept(i)−Dept(x)
formally translates the notion of residual income. It is easy to show that this difference is just the lost-capital
residual income. We have
Dept(i)−Dept(x) =
(
at − i
n∑
k=t
ak
(1 + i)k−(t−1)
− i sn(i)
(1 + i)n−(t−1)
)
−
−
(
at − x
n∑
k=t
ak
(1 + x)k−(t−1)
− x sn(x)
(1 + x)n−(t−1)
)
. (13)
By definition of internal rate of return (discount function), we have
a0(1 + r)n =
n∑
k=1
ak(1 + r)n−k + sn(r) =
t−1∑
k=1
ak(1 + r)n−k +
n∑
k=t
ak(1 + r)n−k + sn(r) r = x, i.
Dividing by (1 + r)n−t+1 we have
a0(1 + r)t−1 =
t−1∑
k=1
ak
(1 + r)k−(t−1)
+
n∑
k=t
ak
(1 + r)k−(t−1)
+
sn(r)
(1 + r)n−(t−1)
r = x, i
6In financial terms, this boils down to investing funds either at the rate x or at the rate i.
7That i is actually an internal rate of return for asset A is easily shown:
−a0 +
n∑
t=1
at
(1 + i)t
+
sn(i)
(1 + i)n
= −a0 +
n∑
t=1
at
(1 + i)t
+
(
a0 −
n∑
t=1
at
(1 + i)t
)
= 0.
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whence
a0(1 + r)t−1 −
t−1∑
k=1
ak
(1 + r)k−(t−1)
=
n∑
k=t
ak
(1 + r)k−(t−1)
+
sn(r)
(1 + r)n−(t−1)
r = x, i
From eqs. (3) and (4) we find
a0(1 + r)t−1 −
t−1∑
k=1
ak(1 + r)t−1−k = wt−1(r) and sn(r) = wn(r), r = x, i
so that eq. (13) becomes
Dept(i)−Dept(x) = (at − iwt−1(i))− (at − xwt−1(x))
= xwt−1(x)− iwt−1(i) = RILt .
(14)
The lost-capital residual income may therefore be represented as an excess depreciation charge.
3.4 The depreciation argument (b)
A particular important case of the depreciation argument relates the notion of residual income to the key-
nesian notion of user cost. In his General Theory of Employment Interest and Money Keynes defines user
cost, with reference to the entrepreneur, as the difference between “the value of his capital equipment at
the end of the period . . . and . . . the value it might have had at the end of the period if he had refrained
from using it” (Keynes, 1967, p. 66). Some years after, the same concept is investigated in Coase (1968),
who relabels it depreciation through use, because it measures the decline in value due (not to time but) to
a different use of the asset. To compute user cost we must therefore calculate “the present value of the net
receipts . . . by discounting them at a rate of interest” (Coase, 1968, p. 123). This “rate of discount coincides
with that in the market” (Scott, 1953, p. 378). Using our symbols, to compute user cost one must discount
the relevant expected cash flows. Reminding the arbitrage-based description in subsection 3.1 and supposing
the investor does not undertake the project, his payoff vector is (−a0, a1, . . . , an +wn(i)); if, instead, project
is undertaken, his payoff vector is (−a0, a1, . . . , an). In the former case the discounted value of the cash-flow
stream is, at time t,
∑n
k=t+1 ak(1 + i)
t−k+wn(i)(1 + i)t−n, whereas in the latter case the discounted value
of the cash-flow stream is
∑n
k=t+1 ak(1 + i)
t−k. Therefore,
user cost =
[ n∑
k=t+1
ak(1 + i)t−k + wn(i)(1 + i)t−n
]− n∑
k=t+1
ak(1 + i)t−k
= wn(i)(1 + i)t−n.
(15)
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User cost is just the discounted value of the arbitrage payoff. This is implicitly acknowledged by Keynes
himself, who recognizes the user cost as “the discounted value of the additional prospective yield which
would be obtained at some later date” (Keynes, 1967, p. 70).
It is easy to show that user cost acts as a depreciation charge with respect to use rather than to time.
Using eqs. (3) and (4), we easily find wt(x) =
∑n
k=t+1
ak
(1+x)k−t and wt(i) =
∑n
k=t+1
ak
(1+i)k−t +
wn(i)
(1+i)n−t .
Therefore,
wt(i)− wt(x) =
[ n∑
k=t+1
ak
(1 + i)k−t
+ wn(i)(1 + i)t−n
]− n∑
k=t+1
ak
(1 + x)k−t
. (16)
If the market value of the asset is selected as the outstanding capital (i.e. if one sets wt(x):=Vt), eq. (16)
just represents the user cost above computed: given that Vt=
∑n
k=t+1
ak
(1+i)k−t , eqs. (15) and (16) coincide.
Putting it differently, eq. (15) is a particular case of eq. (16); the latter provides a generalized notion of
the keynesian user cost. It is worth noting that the lost-capital residual income may be expressed as the
periodic variation of this (generalized) user cost: from eq. (14) and the usual recurrence equations we get to
RILt =
user cost in t︷ ︸︸ ︷
[wt−1(i)− wt−1(x)]−
user cost in t− 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
[wt(i)− wt(x)] .
3.5 The compounding argument
The lost-capital residual income may be generated with a compounding process that directly relates the two
paradigms. To this end, the new paradigm is interpreted with the eye of a standard-minded evaluator.
The starting point is the standard residual income, which represents the periodic surplus accrued to
the project. Let us focus on the t−th period and assume that the surpluses RIS1 , RIS2 , . . ., RISt−1 are
reinvested, as they are generated, at the opportunity cost of capital i. At time t−1 the accumulated surplus
is
∑t−1
k=1 RI
S
k (1 + i)
t−1−k. As a result, in the t-th period the investor receives the return xwt−1(x) from the
project and the return i
∑t−1
k=1 RI
S
k (1 + i)
t−1−k from the accumulated surplus. Given that wt−1(x) could be
invested at the rate i, the investor foregoes the return iwt−1(x). Therefore,
residual income = xwt−1(x) + i
t−1∑
k=1
RISk (1 + i)
t−1−k − iwt−1(x)
= RISt + i
t−1∑
k=1
RISk (1 + i)
t−1−k.
(17)
The above residual income is just RILt . To show it, we remind that
wt−1(i) = w0(i)(1 + i)t−1 −
t−1∑
k=1
ak(1 + i)t−1−k
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and ak = wk−1(x)(1 + x)− wk(x), so that
wt−1(i) = w0(x)(1 + i)t−1 −
t−1∑
k=1
(wk−1(x)(1 + x)− wk(x))(1 + i)t−1−k.
Upon rearranging terms, we find
wt−1(i) = wt−1(x)−
t−1∑
k=1
wk(x)(x− i)(1 + i)t−1−k (18)
= wt−1(x)−
t−1∑
k=1
RISk (1 + i)
t−1−k. (19)
Consequently, eq. (17) becomes the lost-capital residual income:
residual income = RISt + i
t−1∑
k=1
RISk (1 + i)
t−1−k (20)
= RISt + i (wt−1(x)− wt−1(i)) (21)
= xwt−1(x)− iwt−1(i) = RILt . (22)
Focussing on the right-hand side of eq. (21), the second addend is the additional periodic return earned or
given up by the investor in a period if he accepts the project. In such a case, he owns a capital greater
or smaller by |wt−1(i) − wt−1(x)| than the capital he would own in the rejection case. On this differential
amount he earns or foregoes a return rate of i. But eq. (19) tells us that
wt−1(x)− wt−1(i) =
t−1∑
k=1
RISk (1 + i)
t−1−k, (23)
i.e., the additional capital is just the compounded sum of all previous standard residual incomes. In other
words, the accumulated surpluses of the past RISk , k = 1, 2, . . . , t−1 represent the (additional or foregone)
return “forgotten” by the standard paradigm.
As a result, the lost-capital paradigm may be seen as induced by a standard line of reasoning: it is just
a standard residual income that keeps memory of the past (standard) residual incomes. (See Table 1 for a
formal resume of the four arguments).
Remark 2. In the light of what we have seen in the previous subsection it is worthwhile noting that the
accumulated standard residual incomes just represent the generalized user cost of eq. (16) (changed in sign).
The user cost is therefore financially equivalent to the sum of compounded standard past residual incomes.
This result is important for two reasons: first, user cost, which was defined by Keynes in a forward-looking
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perspective, is now expressed with a backward-looking perspective (past residual incomes); second, a relation
linking firm value, lost capital and user cost is easily established: taking wt(x)=Vt one finds, from eq. (23),
Vt = wt(i) +
t∑
k=1
RISk (1 + i)
t−k
= lost capital + user cost.
The market value of a firm (project) may therefore be expressed as the sum of the lost capital and the user
cost.
4 Relations between paradigms
Both paradigms rest on the conceptual identity:
Residual income = Actual income− Foregone income,
where the foregone income is the opportunity cost of investing in the project and acts as a capital charge:
Residual income = Actual income− Capital charge.
The foregone income is also interpreted as a normal income generated by a firm in the same class of risk,
and residual income is therefore often called abnormal earning:
Abnormal earning = Actual income− normal income.
The differences between the two paradigms reside in the way the capital charge is calculated, and therefore
in the notion of foregone income. The latter is the return the investor would have if he invested in the
counterfactual alternative at the rate i. According to the standard paradigm (paradigm S), the investor could
periodically invest the capital actually employed in the project (=wt(x)) at the return rate i. Conversely,
the lost-capital paradigm (paradigm L) takes into consideration the fact that if the investor undertakes the
project he loses the opportunity of owning a different capital (=wt(i)), which could be invested at the return
rate i.8
Therefore, in RIS we have
capital charge=actual capital · foregone return rate,
8The capital wt(i) is not simply foregone, but definitely lost; therefore in paradigm L the foregone income is a lost unrecov-
erable income. It is evident that the lost capital coincides with O’Hanlon and Peasnell’s (2002) unrecovered capital.
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whereas in RIF we have
capital charge=lost capital · foregone return rate.
While both paradigms measure the foregone return, they provide different (legitimate) interpretations of such
a notion: in paradigm S foregoing return refers to “foregoing the return rate i”, in paradigm L foregoing
return refers not only to “foregoing the return rate i” but also to “foregoing the capital wt−1(i)”
Using the replicating cash-flow argument above, the capital charge is arrived to by answering two different
questions. The standard-minded investor asks:
“What would income be in the t-th period if a0 were initially invested in the project and wt−1(x)
were invested at the rate i”?
whereas the lost-capital-minded investor asks:
“What would income be in the t-th period if the amount a0 were invested in a replicating cash-flow
stream yielding return at the rate i?”
Looking at eq. (21), it is evident that RIS and RIL may differ not only in terms of absolute value but also
in terms of sign. Therefore, there may be instances where a model signals positive performance whereas the
other one signals negative performance: even if xt > i (i. e. RISt is positive), RI
L
t may still be negative if
wt−1(i) is sufficiently greater than wt−1(x). In other words, if the investor did not undertake the project,
his wealth could be greater than the one produced by the project, enough to offset the smaller rate of
return i yielded by the counterfactual alternative. Conversely, if a periodic rate of return xt is smaller
than the opportunity cost of capital, then paradigm S signals poor performance, but nonetheless wt−1(i)
may be so small with respect to wt−1(x) as to more than compensate, leading to an overall positive excess
profit in paradigm L. Even when the signs of RISt and RI
L
t coincide, consistently indicating positive or
negative performance, the magnitude is, in general, different. We actually have that RILt 6= RISt whenever
wt−1(i) 6= wt−1(x). In particular, as long as xt > i, the lost-capital paradigm signals a poorer (respectively,
better) performance if wt−1(i) > wt−1(x) (respectively, wt−1(i) < wt−1(x)). The reason is evident: paradigm
L takes account of the fact that if wt−1(i) 6= wt−1(x) an investor undertaking the project renounces in the
t−th period to owning a capital greater (or smaller) by an amount of |wt−1(i) − wt−1(x)|. That is, he
renounces to receiving a positive (respectively, negative) return on that amount at a rate i. This implies
that paradigm L produces performance indexes that are sensitive to the counterfactual time evolution of the
capital invested, whereas paradigm S erases all the counterfactual story keeping only the counterfactual rate
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i. In particular, by splitting RIL into two addends, eq. (20) tells us that positive (negative) performances
will positively (negatively) reverberate in the following periods tending to increase (lower) RIL with respect
to RIS . If performance is good in one year, next-year residual income will be positively affected regardless of
whether xt is greater or smaller than i. For example, if it should happen that xt < i in some period, then the
residual income benefits from the second addend of eq. (20), which acts as an insurance bonus. If, instead,
xt > i, then the insurance part become an additional return. Evidently, the additional term works well if
wt−1(i) < wt−1(x). But this just depends on the past performances. If it occurs that wt−1(i) > wt−1(x),
the additional term is negative, which tends to lower residual income even if xt > i. Again, this depends on
the past performances.
Remark 3. To say that the lost-capital residual income depends on past performances makes sense only if
one employs a standard line of reasoning: to a standard-minded evaluator paradigm L is just paradigm S
with an added memory to recall the past. But to a lost-capital-minded evaluator, the comparison is just
between two alternative incomes pertaining to the same period, and the residual income of one year does not
reverberate on the following years. From this point of view, the additional term
∑t−1
k=1 RI
S
k (1 + i)
t−1−k does
not represent accumulated (standard) residual incomes, but is just the additional capital that the investor
could invest in the t-th period if he selected, at time 0, the counterfactual course of action. This is (again)
consistent with the keynesian notion of user cost, seen as a depreciation due to different use of the funds
(Coase, 1968).
5 Book values, market values, and income aggregation
A very important issue is the relation paradigm L bears to a project’s Net Present Value (firm’s Market
Value Added), and, therefore, to market values. If a residual-income paradigm is not consistent with the
NPV, then it should be evidently dismissed. We now show that both paradigms are consistent with the NPV
though with an opposite procedure:9 paradigm S requires a discount-then-sum mechanism, while paradigm
9As for paradigm S, the result is well-known (e.g. Edwards and Bell, 1961, ch. 2; Peasnell, 1981, 1982; Ohlson, 1995; Martin
and Petty, 2000, ch. 5; Lundholm and O’Keefe, 2001; Ve´lez-Pareja and Tham, 2003).
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L requires a sum-then-discount approach. For the former we have, discounting and then summing:
n∑
t=1
RISt
(1 + i)t
=
n∑
t=1
wt−1(x)(x− i)
(1 + i)t
=
n∑
t=1
wt(x) + at − wt−1(x)(1 + i)
(1 + i)t
=
n∑
t=1
wt(x) + at
(1 + i)t
−
n∑
t=1
wt−1(x)
(1 + i)t−1
=
n∑
t=1
at
(1 + i)t
− a0 = NPV
where we have used the equality a0 +
∑n
t=1 wt(x)(1 + i)
−t =
∑n
t=1 wt−1(x)(1 + i)
−(t−1).10 As for paradigm
L, if we first sum excess profits and then discount them back we obtain the NPV. To show it, just consider
that, taking the sum in eq. (17) and rearranging terms, we have
n∑
t=1
RILt =
n∑
t=1
(
RISt + i
t−1∑
k=1
RISk (1 + i)
t−1−k)
=
n∑
t=1
RISt (1 + i
t∑
k=1
(1 + i)n−k)
=
n∑
t=1
RISt (1 + i)
n−t
where the last equation is derived by induction. Discounting back,
1
(1 + i)n
n∑
t=1
RILt =
1
(1 + i)n
n∑
t=1
RISt (1 + i)
n−t
=
n∑
t=1
RISt (1 + i)
−t
= NPV.
(24)
The net terminal value is therefore obtained by a sum of uncompounded residual incomes:
NPV(1 + i)n =
n∑
t=1
RILt . (25)
The results in eqs. (24) and (25) have interesting theoretical and practical implications: they provide a
strong link between accounting data and market values. Recalling that NPV=E0−a0 and letting wt(x) be
the equity book value we have, from eq. (24),
E0 = a0 +
1
(1 + i)n
n∑
t=1
RILt , (26)
10We remind that wn(x) = 0, because x is an internal rate of return (discount function) for project a.
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which says that the market value of equity is given by the book value plus the sum of future lost-capital
residual incomes. The above equation highlights that time is not important. To compute market values, one
does not have to worry about relating each abnormal earning to each date in which it is generated. It suffices
to have information about the aggregate residual incomes expected in the future. From an accountant’s point
of view, this relation should be welcome, because it dispenses with both cash flows and time, which are the
two fundamental bricks of the discounted-cash-flow techniques. Equation (26), alongside eq. (25) above,
stresses the major role of (residual) incomes in both valuation and capital budgeting: to compute value
and net terminal values dividends and time are unnecessary, and are replaced by total (residual) income.
If past data about residual incomes are available, these formulas are extremely helpful for appraising firms
and projects as well as for solving capital budgeting decision problems. Alternatively, one can separately
use data about incomes and data about normal incomes: rewriting the relation as
E0 = equity book value +
1
(1 + i)n
( n∑
t=1
accounting incomes−
n∑
t=1
normal incomes
)
(27)
one gets the market value of equity by forecasting the total actual incomes and the total normal incomes
generated in the span of n periods. Both procedures are far easier and more reliable than (predicting
dividends or) predicting residual incomes at each date, as is done in the standard paradigm. This aggregation
property, which is typical of accounting, enables the evaluator to rest on an average abnormal earning (or,
separately, on an average earning and an average normal earning) to determine the total abnormal earning
that will be generated in the span of n periods. This automatically supplies the net terminal value of the
project (firm), and the solution to the accept/reject decision problem. Adding the equity book value and
discounting back the total dollar abnormal earnings, the current market value is obtained.
By making use of the standard paradigm, Ohlson (1989, 1995) has shown the striking result that, under
assumption of a determined stochastic process for abnormal earnings, total incomes approach market value in
the long run, regardless of the dividend policy of the firm. This section has shown that paradigm L offers the
opportunity to directly compute the current market value (and the net terminal value) in terms of earning
aggregation with no assumption about stochastic processes and whatever the value of n. From a practical
point of view, the suggestion to be given to the evaluator is a simple one: predict total (lost-capital) residual
income. Current and past earnings (abnormal earnings) may actually be good predictors of future earnings
(abnormal earnings), certainly much better than dividends. And if one adds the fact that paradigm L, as
opposed to paradigm S, does not rest on time to compute (present and terminal) values, the usefulness of
the new paradigm for fundamental analysis becomes apparent (see Penman, 1992, on importance of earnings
aggregation in a value sense).
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6 Converting standard residual income into lost-capital residual
income
The two paradigms generate several performance measures. In particular, for each such measure complying
with paradigm S there corresponds a companion measure in paradigm L. Conversion is made by replacing
the foregone income of paradigm S with the lost income of paradigm L. For illustrative purposes, we focus
on Stewart’s (1991) Economic Value Added (EVA) and on the Edwards-Bell-Ohlson (EBO) model (Edwards
and Bell, 1961; Ohlson, 1995),11 The two metrics belong to the set of standard residual income models, and
are complementary: EVA adopts an entity (claimholders) approach; EBO adopts a proprietary (shareholder)
approach.
6.1 EVA
Assume that (i) the book value of the firm’s assets is taken as the outstanding capital, (ii) the free cash flows
are taken as the relevant cash flows (iii) the RONA (Return On Net Assets) is taken as the periodic rate of
return, and (iv) the WACC is taken as the opportunity cost of capital. Formally, this means wt(x):=Vbvt ,
at:=FCF, x:=RONA, i :=WACC. Therefore, eq. (3) becomes
Vbvt = V
bv
t−1 · (1 + RONA)− FCF
for t>0, and Vbv0 :=a0. Reminding that V
bv
t−1·RONA=NOPAT and applying eq. (2), the standard performance
measure becomes
RIS = NOPAT−WACC ·Vbvt−1. (28)
If, instead, paradigm L is applied, letting wt(i) := Vt be the lost capital and using eq. (4) one finds
Vt = Vt−1 · (1 + WACC)− FCF
for t>0, with V0:=a0. Thus, the lost-capital measure (eq. (5)) results in
RIL = NOPAT−WACC · Vt−1. (29)
The measures in eqs. (28) and (29) represent the original Economic Value Added and its lost-capital com-
panion, respectively.
11Abusing notation, we will henceforth use the acronym EBO to refer to the corresponding residual income as well.
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6.2 EBO
A different metric is generated when (i) the book value of equity is taken as the outstanding capital, (ii)
the equity cash flows are taken as the relevant cash flows, (iii) the ROE (Return On Equity) is taken as the
periodic rate of return, and (iv) the cost of equity ke is taken as the opportunity cost of capital. Formally,
wt(x):=Ebvt , at:=ECF, x:=ROE, i:=ke, so that
Ebvt = E
bv
t−1 · (1 + ROE)− ECF
for t>0, with Ebv0 :=a0. Therefore, reminding that E
bv
t−1 · ROE=PAT, the standard measure becomes
RIF = PAT− ke · Ebvt−1. (30)
If one applies paradigm L to this measure and let wt(i) := Et be the lost equity, one has
Et = Et−1 · (1 + ke)− ECF
for t > 0, with E0 := a0. Thus, the lost-capital measure results in
RIS = PAT− ke · Et−1. (31)
The measures in eqs. (30) and (31) represent EBO as originally conceived and its lost-capital companion,
respectively. To sum up, the standard paradigm depends on the threesome (RONA, WACC, Vbv),12 whereas
the lost-capital paradigm depends on the foursome (RONA, WACC, Vbv, V) (see Table 2).13
7 An example
This section applies the two paradigms to a firm created to undertake a project that requires an initial
investment of 13 800, of which 12 000 are spent in fixed assets and 1 800 in working capital requirements.
Straight-line depreciation is assumed for the fixed assets. It is also assumed that the required return on
assets is 12% and that the book value of debt equals the market value of debt (i.e. debt rate=required return
to debt). Other input data are collected in Table 3; Table 4 gives the firm’s accounting statements and the
resulting cash flows, and Table 5 focuses on equity and firm valuation. The market value of equity is first
found by using three different discounted-cash-flow methods: the Adjusted Present Value (APV) method,
introduced by Myers (1974), the ECF-ke method (equity approach), and the FCF-WACC method (entity
12Or (ROE, ke, Ebv) for EBO.
13Or (ROE, ke, Ebv , E) for EBO.
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approach). Logically, they all give the same result (see Ferna´ndez, 2002). Afterwards, a residual-income
perspective is used to obtain the market value: Tables 6-7 show the application of the two paradigms to
the EVA model and the EBO model. Obviously, both paradigms supply the same market values as the
discounted-cash-flow technique’s.14
The examples show a situation of positive EVAs and EBOs in each period. First of all, note that in the first
period the two paradigms give the same answer, because the outstanding capitals coincide (w0(x) = w0(i)).
In the next periods, the lost-capital measures are constantly greater than the standard measures. Also, the
periodic variation in the lost-capital measures are greater. For example, in Table 6 the standard EVA’s
variations are given by (281, 282, 283, 286), the lost-capital EVA’s variations are (282, 313, 347, 376). In
Table 7 we have, consistently, that the EBO’s variations are (296, 298, 306, 372) and (302, 350, 427, 811),
respectively.
As anticipated, the lost-capital has an insurance component for negative situations, which is just the
user cost previously introduced. Suppose the fourth-year sales amount to 8 000 instead of 10 000 (Table 8),
other things equal. Both paradigms report negative performance in the fourth year.15 Yet, the lost-capital
paradigm smoothes the negativeness, because it takes account of the fact that the past year’s results were
better, which implies that the lost capital at the beginning of the fourth year is smaller than the actual
capital employed: Vbv3 > V3 and E
bv
3 > E3. It is easy to see that if the fourth-year sales are equal to 8 600
instead of 10 000 (other things unvaried), the corresponding standard measures become negative, whereas
the lost-capital measures keep positive (Table 9). In this case, while the RONA (respectively, ROE) is
indeed smaller than the WACC (respectively, ke) in the fourth year, the bonus given by the additional
amount WACC4·(Vbv3 − V3)=96 (respectively, ke4 ·(Ebv3 − E3)=185) is so high as to more than compensate
the negative standard EVA (respectively, EBO): we have 16=−80+96, and 164=−21+185.
Evidently, the bonus may symmetrically act a penalty role if past performance is negative. For example,
consider the case where in the third year sales amount to 8 000 (other things unvaried). This makes the
third-year residual incomes negative for both paradigms (Table 10). Due to insurance bonus for positive past
performances, the lost-capital residual incomes are less negative than the standard ones. Yet, the third-year
negative performance penalizes the fourth-year performance, which is smaller than that reported by the
standard residual incomes. Note that in the fifth year, performance recorded by the lost-capital paradigm is
14As previously shown, the time ordering of residual incomes is immaterial in paradigm L, if the objective is firm valuation.
However, if the objective of the analysis is incentive compensation, time is obviously relevant in this paradigm as well.
15The reader should not be discomforted by the fact that each period’s residual income changes. If one period’s sales change,
the corresponding ECF and FCF change, so that the market value of equity is changed in every year, which implies that both
ke and WACC change in every year, which in turn induces a change in the capital charge of every period.
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again higher than the standard one’s, due to the renewed recent positive performance of the fourth year. In
other words, as compared to the standard metric, performance is amplified in negative and in positive sense
(bonus and penalty roles).16
It is also worth noting that the dependence of a lost-capital measure on the past is not an easy one
(the measure does not merely depends on the previous period’s RISt−1, but on RI
S
1 , RI
S
2 , . . . , RI
S
t−2, and
therefore on all the previous rates of return and all the previous opportunity costs of capital). It may be
conjectured that managers willing to pursue personal objective may refrain from gaming the measure, given
that they hardly will be able to assess the consequences on the following years’ indexes. What they are aware
of is that their performance is measured on the ground of past residual incomes as well as the current one.
Whether these elements tend to reduce agency problems and whether managers rewarded through a lost-
capital residual income are more inclined to behave optimally is not a trivial issue and deserves a thorough
investigation. The efficacy of the paradigm also depends on the type of compensation plan selected. For
example there are at least three ways of using a metric: the historical use, according to which the manager’s
bonus is a share of the RI:
bonus = x% RI;
the XY compensation plan, according to which bonus is tied to RI variation:
bonus = x% RI + y% ∆ RI;
and the excess RI improvement plan, according to which the expected RI improvement (EI) plays a major
role:
bonus = target bonus +y% (∆ RI−EI)
(see Young and O’Byrne, 2001). For positive-RI companies using either the historical plan or the XY
plan, we can say that the manager’s bonuses computed with the lost-capital paradigm are greater than
the ones computed in the standard paradigm, because in the former both RI and ∆ RI are greater than the
corresponding ones in the latter (proof is straightforward using eq. (20)). However, things are complicated by
the fact that comparisons may be made along two dimensions: the type of metric selected and the paradigm
chosen. That is, a metric in a paradigm may be compared with the same metric in the alternative paradigm,
16It is worth stressing again that the memory-dependent interpretation is a useful one for comparing the two paradigms, but
it presupposes a standard-minded point of view. The memory-dependent feature of the lost-capital metrics just means that if
money were invested at the opportunity cost of capital, the investor would have, in each period, a different (greater or smaller)
capital. This appreciation or depreciation, equal to the keynesian user cost, would imply, in that very period, an additional or
foregone interest. Such an interest is a penalty if positive, a bonus if negative.
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or with an alternative metric in the same paradigm, or with an alternative metric in the alternative paradigm.
Having two paradigms and a wide set of metrics it may be the case that a metric in one paradigm is more
incentive than a different metric in the alternative paradigm. Given that firms may use many different
plans to compute managers’bonuses, the impact on performance measurement and incentive compensation
depends on (at least) three factors:
• the paradigm
• the metric
• the compensation plan
8 Aligning performance measures with value creation
A mystifying problem in value-based management is that residual income does not measure value creation in
the period considered, so that either some adjustments are made to residual income itself or compensation
plans are devised so as to tie residual income to value creation, in order to align managers’ behaviors to
shareholders’ objectives (Ehrbar, 1998; Stewart, 1991; O’Hanlon and Peasnell, 2000; Young and O’Byrne,
2001; Martin et al., 2003). Grinyer (1985, 1987) proposes an index labelled Earned Economic Income, which
has the nice property of being aligned with the Net Present Value. However, beside the fact that “the
relationship between EEI and RI appears not to be well understood” (Peasnell, 1995, p. 235), his metric
is equal in sign to the NPV only if the project’s cash flows are all of the same sign (Martin et al., 2003,
Peasnell, 1995, Grinyer, 1995). This section shows that converting Ferna´ndez’s (2002) Created Shareholder
Value into the corresponding lost-capital metric, one obtains a metric that is perfectly aligned with the Net
Present Value, irrespective of the sign of the cash flows (i.e. even if some cash flows are opposite in sign).
The Created Shareholder Value (CSV) belongs to the class of standard residual income models. It is
computed by picking at=ECF, wt(x)=Et for every t≥1 and i=ke. Reminding the initial condition w0(x):=a0,
the residual income in this model is
CSVt =
a0(xt − ke) if t = 1Et−1(xt − ke) if t > 1 (32)
where xt=(Et + at− at−1)/at−1 if t=1 (see Ferna´ndez, 2002, p. 281), xt=ke otherwise (this implies CSVt=0
for all t>1 if expectations are met). In order to convert the standard CSV into its lost-capital companion,
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the capital charge keEt−1 must be replaced by keEt−1 so that residual income becomes
lost-capital CSVt =
a0(xt − ke) if t = 1ke(Et−1 − Et−1) if t > 1. (33)
As for the t=1, we have
CSV1 = a0
(E1 + a1 − a0
a0
− ke
)
=
(E1 + a1
1 + ke
− a0
)
(1 + ke) = NPV(1 + ke).
As for t>1, note that the difference (Et−1−Et−1) is exactly the keynesian user cost of eq. (15) in an eq-
uity approach, because Et=
∑n
k=t+1 ak(1 + ke)
−(k−t) and Et=
∑n
k=t+1 ak(1 + ke)
−(k−t)+En(1 + ke)−(n−t).
Therefore,
Et−1 − Et−1 = En(1 + ke)−(n−t+1).
But En = a0(1 + ke)n −
∑n
k=1 ak(1 + ke)
n−k = −NPV(1 + ke)n, so that one may write
Et−1 − Et−1 = NPV(1 + ke)t−1
whence
CSVt = ke(Et−1 − Et−1) = keNPV(1 + ke)t−1.
As a result, the lost-capital companion of CSV is always aligned in sign with the NPV. Indeed, it measures
the increase of Net Present Value period by period:
ke(Et−1 − Et−1) = NPV(1 + ke)t −NPV(1 + ke)t−1 = ∆ NPV.
Referring to the example of section 7, Table 11 supplies the value of CSV in the two paradigms.
9 Conclusions
This paper presents a new paradigm of residual income aimed at appraising projects (firms) as well as
measuring periodic performance. Originally introduced in Magni (2000, 2003, 2005) with the name of
Systemic Value Added, the new paradigm translates the notion of opportunity cost differently from the
classical paradigm. The new paradigm takes account of the capital foregone by the investor as well as the
foregone return rate. In other words, if the investor invested in the alternative asset he would have, at
the beginning of each period, a different capital than the actual one. This capital, which is definitely lost if
project is undertaken, would generate income at the opportunity cost of capital. Hence, the paradigm is here
relabelled “lost-capital paradigm”. This paper presents four alternative but equivalent way of conceptualizing
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the lost-capital paradigm: (i) the project’s (firm’s) cash-flow stream may be replicated by investing funds
at the cost of capital: the lost-capital RI is given by the difference between the alternative incomes; (ii) the
dynamic system representing the investors’ wealth manifests a different increase if funds are invested funds
at the cost of capital: the lost-capital RI is given by the difference between alternative wealth increases; (iii)
alternative depreciation plans are considered: the lost-capital RI is obtained as difference between alternative
depreciation charges; (iv) the standard RI may be ideally banked to earn a rate of return equal to the cost
of capital: the lost-capital RI is calculated by summing the standard RI and the interest earned on the
accumulated past standard RIs.
The four arguments bear strong relations one another. In particular, the depreciation argument makes
use of a generalization of the keynesian notion of user cost : residual income in the lost-capital paradigm may
be seen as the periodic variation of the generalized user cost (subsection 3.3). User cost is, in turn, equal to
the discounted value of the arbitrage payoff derived from the replicating portfolio (subsection 3.1) and equal
to the accumulated past (standard) residual incomes (subsection 3.5). Also, the wealth increase argument
is equivalent to the depreciation argument: in this case depreciation is computed on the entire net worth,
taking account of the entire net worth derived from reinvestment of the cash flows at the cost of capital (see
eq. (8)).
With the aid of the fourth argument, which relates the standard paradigm to the lost-capital paradigm,
this paper shows that consistency with the NPV (MVA) is guaranteed in the lost-capital paradigm as
well: but, whereas the standard paradigm uses a discount-then-sum procedure, the lost-capital paradigm
uses a sum-then-discount mechanism; what differs is the distribution of the NPV across periods. While
such a distribution is relevant for the standard paradigm to get the market value, it is not for the lost-
capital paradigm: forecasting each (lost-capital) residual income and the corresponding period in which it is
generated is unnecessary. Only the total sum of residual incomes is needed. Thus, the aggregation property
of the lost-capital paradigm makes the residual income models particularly attractive as opposed to the
discounted-cash-flow models and, in addition, offers an improvement with respect to the standard paradigm:
the latter supplies the equity market value (and net terminal value) only if each and every residual income
is forecasted for each and every year.
As for value-based management, the lost-capital paradigm amplifies results with respect to the standard
paradigm, both in positive and negative sense. This and other features are worth investigating in order
to ascertain which conditions make the new paradigm more incentive a tool for managers. Evidently, this
also depends on the kind of compensation scheme used by the company to reward managers. For example,
if the XY compensation plan is used (where bonus = x% RI+y% ∆ RI), the lost-capital paradigm is more
incentive for positive-RI companies, because both RI and ∆ RI are greater in the lost-capital paradigm than
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in the standard one. A further element that deserves a detailed analysis is how residual incomes change
when expectations change and/or are not met, with particular concern to relation with value creation.
A particular model that deserves a thorough investigation is the lost-capital companion of Ferna´ndez’s
(2002) Created Shareholder Value. It is shown that the metric obtained from its conversion into the lost-
capital paradigm is perfectly aligned in sign with the Net Present Value. In this particular case, residual
income does measure value creation and this kind of metric could be fruitfully used for management com-
pensation.
The new paradigm may be an opportunity to search for new theoretical insights in management ac-
counting and managerial finance as regards the relations among accounting values, market values, value
creation. Also, it adds some irons in the fire of the value-based management debate. This, far from being
a problem, should be seen as an opportunity for developing new measures and finding intriguing relations
across metrics and across paradigms. It may be of some interest to find out whether the differences in the
standard metrics are mirrored by the differences in the corresponding lost-capital metrics, or whether pros
and cons of either measure change as the paradigm adopted is changed. It may be the case that the search
for a satisfying compensation plan will lead to an index based on multiple metrics, possibly involving the
use of both paradigms.
As a final consideration, it is evident that the aggregation property of the lost-capital paradigm establishes
a powerful argument for management accounting to play a major role in project and firm valuation, as well as
in capital budgeting decision problems. On one side, Ohlson’s breakthrough result says that, under suitable
assumptions on the stochastic process of abnormal earnings and with n sufficiently large, the future market
value is approximated by a function of earnings; on the other side, the lost-capital result says that, under
no particular assumption on stochastic processes and whatever the value of n, the current market value is
equal to a function of earnings. These two results are conducive to a reinstatement of fundamental analysis
as an important tool for either valuation and capital budgeting purposes.
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Table 1. The four arguments
cash-flow replicated
return from project︷ ︸︸ ︷
xwt−1(x)
lost return︷ ︸︸ ︷
iwt−1(i)
wealth increases
wealth increase︷ ︸︸ ︷
Wt(x, i)−Wt−1(x, i)
lost wealth increase︷ ︸︸ ︷
Wt(i)−Wt−1(i)
Lost-capital
depreciation charges
asset’s depreciation︷ ︸︸ ︷
Dept(x)
lost depreciation︷ ︸︸ ︷
Dept(i)
residual income
standard RI capitalized
standard RI︷ ︸︸ ︷
RISt
foregotten return︷ ︸︸ ︷
i
t−1∑
k=1
RISk (1 + i)
t−1−k
Table 2. EVA and EBO variables in the two paradigms
x i wt(x) wt(i) =⇒ capital charge
⇓ ⇓ ⇓ ⇓ ⇓
Standard Paradigm
EVA RONA WACC Vbv =⇒ WACC· Vbv
EBO ROE ke Ebv =⇒ ke· Ebv
Lost-capital Paradigm
EVA RONA WACC Vbv V =⇒ WACC·V
EBO ROE ke Ebv E =⇒ ke·E
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Table 3. Input data
Investment 13 800 Depreciation rate 20%
Gross Fixed Assets 12 000 Corporate tax rate 33%
WCR 1 800 Required return on assets 12%
Sales 10 000 Debt rate 7%
Cost of Sales 3 670 Required return on debt (kD) 7%
Gen. & Admin. Expenses 1 600
Debt 4 000
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Table 4. Balance Sheet, Income Statement, Cash Flows
time 0 1 2 3 4 5
BALANCE SHEET
Gross fixed assets 12 000 12 000 12 000 12 000 12 000 12 000
−cumulative depreciation 0 −2 400 −4 800 −7 200 −9 600 −12 000
Net fixed assets 12 000 9 600 7 200 4 800 2 400 0
WCR 1 800 1 800 1 800 1 800 1 800 0
NET ASSETS 13 800 11 400 9 000 6 600 4 200 0
Debt 4 000 4 000 4 000 4 000 4 000 0
Equity (book value) 9 800 7 400 5 000 2 600 200 0
NET WORTH & LIABILITIES 13 800 11 400 9 000 6 600 4 200 0
INCOME STATEMENT
Sales 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000
Cost of sales 3 670 3 670 3 670 3 670 3 670
Gen. & Adm. expenses 1 600 1 600 1 600 1 600 1 600
Depreciation 2 400 2 400 2 400 2 400 2 400
EBIT 2 330 2 330 2 330 2 330 2 330
Interest 280 280 280 280 280
PBT 2 050 2 050 2 050 2 050 2 050
Taxes 677 677 677 677 677
PAT 1 374 1 374 1 374 1 374 1 374
+Depreciation 2 400 2 400 2 400 2 400 2 400
+∆ Debt 0 0 0 0 −4 000
−∆ WCR 0 0 0 0 1 800
ECF 3 774 3 774 3 774 3 774 1 574
FCF17 3 961 3 961 3 961 3 961 5 761
17FCF=ECF−∆D + kDD · (1 − T ).
31
Table 5. Valuation
time 0 1 2 3 4 5
kU 12% 12% 12% 12% 12%
VU=PV[FCF; kU ] 15 300 13 175 10 795 8 129 5 144 0
DVTS=PV[T·kD·D; kD](a) 379 313 242 167 86 0
V =VU+DVTS 15 679 13 488 11 038 8 296 5 230 0
E=VU+DVTS−D 11679 9 488 7 038 4 296 1 230 0
ke 13.550% 13.943% 14.670% 16.461% 27.907%
E=PV[ECF; ke] 11679 9 488 7 038 4 296 1 230 0
WACC 11.290% 11.199% 11.053% 10.786% 10.151%
V =PV[FCF; WACC] 15 679 13 488 11 038 8 296 5 230 0
E=V−D 11679 9 488 7 038 4 296 1 230 0
MVA=NPV=E−Ebv 1 879
(a)The use of kD to compute DVTS is consistent with the findings of Myers (1974) and Ferna´ndez (2005, par. 2.4)
(note that the company repays the debt without issuing new debt).
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Table 6. EVA in the two paradigms
time 0 1 2 3 4 5
NOPAT=EBIT·(1−T ) 1 561 1 561 1 561 1 561 1 561
Vbv=D+Ebv 13 800 11 400 9 000 6 600 4 200 0
V (lost capital) 13 800 11 397 8 712 5 714 2 369 −3 151
Standard Paradigm
capital charge (opportunity cost) 1 558 1 277 995 712 426
EVA 3 284 566 849 1135
MVA (=discount and sum) 1 879
E=Ebv+MVA 11 679
Lost-capital Paradigm
capital charge (opportunity cost) 1 558 1 276 963 616 240
EVA 3 285 598 945 1321
MVA (=sum and discount) 1 879
E=Ebv+MVA 11 679
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Table 7. EBO in the two paradigms
time 0 1 2 3 4 5
PAT 1 374 1 374 1 374 1 374 1 374
Ebv 9 800 7 400 5 000 2 600 200 0
E (lost equity capital) 9 800 7 354 4 606 1 509 −2 017 −4 153
Standard Paradigm
capital charge (opportunity cost) 1 328 1 032 733 428 56
EBO 46 342 640 946 1318
MVA (=discount and sum) 1 879
E=Ebv+MVA 11 679
Lost-capital Paradigm
capital charge (opportunity cost) 1 328 1 025 676 248 −563
EBO 46 348 698 1125 1936
MVA (=sum and discount) 1 879
E=Ebv+MVA 11 679
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Table 8. Fourth-year sales equal to 8000
year 1 2 3 4 5
EVA
Standard Paradigm 9 291 575 −477 1135
Lost-capital paradigm 9 292 608 −381 1188
EBO
Standard Paradigm 34 326 616 −439 1318
Lost-capital paradigm 34 330 671 −251 1537
Table 9. Fourth-year sales equal to 8600
year 1 2 3 4 5
EVA
Standard Paradigm 7 289 573 −80 1135
Lost-capital paradigm 7 290 605 16 1228
EBO
Standard Paradigm 37 331 624 −21 1318
Lost-capital paradigm 37 336 680 164 1658
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Table 10. Third-year sales equal to 8000
year 1 2 3 4 5
EVA
Standard Paradigm 9 292 −763 849 1135
Lost-capital paradigm 9 293 −730 803 1173
EBO
Standard Paradigm 32 323 −727 946 1318
Lost-capital paradigm 32 328 −673 894 1480
Table 11. CSV in the two paradigms
time 0 1 2 3 4 5
outstanding capital 9 800 9 488 7 038 4 296 1 230 0
lost equity capital 9 800 7 354 4 606 1 509 −2 017 −4 153
Standard Paradigm
CSV 2134 0 0 0 0
MVA (=discount and sum) 1 879
E=Ebv+MVA 11 679
Lost-capital Paradigm
CSV 2134 298 357 459 906
MVA (=sum and discount) 1 879
E=Ebv+MVA 11 679
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Table 12. Notational Conventions
~a cash-flow (vector)
at cash flow available at time t
a project
xt, x (periodic) internal rate of return
wt(x) actual capital employed
i opportunity cost of capital
RIS residual income in the standard paradigm
ROA, RONA, ROE Return On Assets, Return On Net Assets, Return On Equity
wt(i) lost capital
RIL residual income in the lost-capital paradigm
W0 investor’s wealth at time 0
Wt(i) investor’s wealth at time t in case of project rejection
Wt(x, i) investor’s wealth at time t in case of project acceptance
NPV Net Present Value
A asset
~A cash-flow (vector)
sn scrap value
vt asset A’s accounting value at time t
Dept depreciation charge
r asset A’s internal rate of return
Vt market value of the project (firm)
Et equity (market value)
EVA Economic Value Added
WACC Weighted Average Cost of Capital
Vbv total capital (book value)
FCF Free Cash Flow
NOPAT Net Operating Profit After Taxes
(The Table is continued on the next page)
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Table 12. (continued) Notational Conventions
Vt total lost capital (equity+debt)
EBO Edwards-Bell-Ohlson
ke cost of equity
Ebv equity (book value)
ECF Equity Cash Flow
PAT Profit After Taxes
Et lost equity capital
RI Residual income
∆ variation
EI expected RI improvement
CSV Created Shareholder Value
MVA Market Value Added
WCR Working Capital Requirements
kD required return on debt (=debt rate)
EBIT Earnings Before Interest and Taxes
PBT Profit Before Taxes
D debt (market value=book value)
T corporate tax rate
kU required return on assets
VU value of the unlevered firm
PV[A; B]
∑n
t=1
At∏t
k=1(1+Bk)
DVTS discounted value of tax shields
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